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Introduction
In the coming decades, aging populations and high levels of public debt are expected to exert increasing pressure on public budgets. This problem is exacerbated by skill shortages and less-than-desirable labor force participation rates. As part of their planned countermeasures, governments are encouraging additional training for the current workforce.
Public sector involvement in labor market training can be justified by several types of market failures, such as credit constraints and positive externalities. Another justification is related to equity concerns and the social costs of unemployment (Hollenbeck, 2008) . Many governments consider market-based training to be insufficient, especially for certain disadvantaged groups, such as older workers, mothers of young children, and low-skilled employees. Although workers from these groups confront the highest risk of job loss and skill depreciation, their participation in training is disproportionately low. For instance, approximately 40 percent of all German firms offer further training, but only 6 percent provide training for employees over 50 (Bellmann and Leber, 2008) .
There is a large body of literature on active labor market program (ALMP) evaluation. As both Kluve et al. (2007) and Card et al. (2010) demonstrate, a substantial share of the literature addresses the evaluation of German programs. Most of the programs (and the related literature) are devoted to improving the qualifications of the unemployed (see for example Greenberg et al., 2003; Heinrich et al., 2009 ). Evaluations of the corresponding German programs typically find negative lock-in effects in the short term but positive effects on employment and earnings over the medium and long term (Lechner and Melly, 2010; Lechner et al., 2011; Fitzenberger and Völter, 2007; Lechner et al., 2007; Fitzenberger and Speckesser, 2007; Fitzenberger et al., 2008) .
In comparison, the body of literature on the effects of government-sponsored further training for employed workers is much smaller. Most of the available studies tend to focus on marked-based training in the European labor market and typically concentrate only on firmlevel outcomes. The results are quite heterogeneous and vary between rather large returns (Almeida and Carneiro, 2009 ) and small figures (see Bassanini et al., 2005 : for a review).
For instance, Swiss training vouchers encouraged workers to increase training participation (Messer and Wolter, 2009) , and Irish government subsidies improved training investments by firms (Görg and Strobl, 2005) . In another study, Dutch tax incentives for employee training were analyzed by Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004) , who found that the incentives failed to produce any measurable improvement in wages. By contrast, Swedish adult education schemes appeared to produce notable (albeit costly) positive effects (Albrecht et al., 2009; Stenberg, 2011) .
Of the programs previously analyzed in the literature, perhaps the most similar to the German WeGebAU is the UK government pilot scheme "Train to Gain." This program aims to increase the level of training provided by employers and focuses on low-skilled employees by offering free or subsidized training for improving basic qualifications, paid time off for training, and wage compensation. Unfortunately, Abramovsky et al. (2011) find that the program failed to produce any notable increase in the proportion of firms that offer training or in the proportion of workers participating. A German program closely linked to WeGebAU is a training voucher program that was implemented in January 2006 in the North Rhine-Westphalia Federal State. This program covered 50 percent of the direct training costs for small and medium-sized establishments. Görlitz (2010) finds that the program increased the share of firms investing in training by 4 to 6 percentage points but had no effect on training intensity.
Our study advances the small body of literature on the evaluation of publicly funded further training programs for employed workers in several ways. First, unlike the bulk of the existing studies (Abramovsky et al., 2011; Görlitz, 2010) , we focus on outcomes at the individual level as opposed to the firm level. Thus, we provide evidence showing that training programs eventually generate benefits from the participants' perspective-in terms of earnings and employment rates. Second, we analyze a different demographic group, older workers, who confront particular labor market difficulties that may intensify in the future. Therefore, we contribute to the literature on the heterogeneous effects of active labor market programs and to the policy debate pertaining to employment of older workers. Finally, we evaluate the German WeGebAU program, a special job-training subsidy introduced in 2006 to target workers who are at least 45 years old in small and medium-sized firms.
1 This program has not previously been analyzed.
Our analysis focuses on post-program employment, and we use registry data from the German Federal Employment Agency, which offers a rich data set that integrates information from different government sources and provides extensive information on individual employment and unemployment histories and workplace characteristics. Because treatment is not randomly allocated, we employ the dynamic matching framework developed by Crépon et al. (2009) . This method identifies the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for monthly strata of participants by comparing them with other eligible workers who did not participate in the program up to the moment of the outcome.
Our results show that WeGebAU increases employment stability by increasing the probability of remaining in paid employment by 1.0 to 2.5 percentage points for two years after the treatment; the effect on entry to insured unemployment is negative but small. The decreasing exit rate from employment is accompanied by a comparable increase in the number of days of employment, with a small and (in most cases) statistically insignificant wage improvement. The effect is more highly concentrated for part-time workers, for those workers in longer training programs, and over 50 years of age. This finding suggests that the positive effect primarily originates from a decreasing tendency to leave the labor force.
Background
WeGebAU ( is to provide further qualifications to those workers who are considered particularly vulnerable to unemployment and loss of employable skills. The government has identified two such groups: older employees and low-skilled employees in small and medium-sized firms.
Since 2007, "older" ones must be at least 45 years of age, and "small firms" must be firms with fewer than 250 employees.
Most of the program participants belong to the low-skilled group. Figure 1 shows the enrollment of low-skilled and older workers over time; there is a rapidly increasing inflow after reforming the program in 2007. Largely unknown in the early years, the program was thereafter widely advertised by local employment agencies. During the recent economic crisis, its funding was increased, and its eligibility criteria were loosened, which caused participation numbers to peak in 2009. In the following years, the criteria were followed more closely again, and participation numbers thus declined substantially.
Both employees and employers can apply for the subsidy. However, during the early years, caseworkers typically initiated participation by personally visiting firms and promoting the program. After one of the parties files an application, the caseworker decides whether the employee fulfills the eligibility requirements. If the requirements are met, then the employee receives a voucher that guarantees reimbursement of training costs (direct program costs and an allowance for related expenditures, such as child care or transportation expenses) and can choose a certain schooling program offered by an educational institution.
The program must be approved by the employment agency. Training must be conducted by an external certified institution, and courses must focus on improving general human capital and must apply to the wider labor market, as firm-specific training is not eligible for subsidies. In 2008, approved courses included the following: vehicle operation; health computer science and ICT; security; and production control. The employer must continue paying wages while the worker is participating in training.
On average, the enrollees in our sample were assigned to training for 115 days, with a minimum of one day and a maximum of 1,472 days. These figures do not necessarily indicate the actual length of full-time training but rather indicate a time span within which an individual is registered as a participant. These periods may include shorter or longer periods of actual participation. Table 1 provides an overview of the corresponding distribution quantiles.
3 Econometric Method
Dynamic Matching
This study analyzes the differences in labor market outcomes for WeGebAU participants and non-participants. The discontinuities in the program design (related to age and firm size) may initially appear to be an attractive identification strategy. However, during the observation period, the program enrolled only approximately 10,000 individuals out of a total labor force of 10 million in the relevant age range. Hence, at one side of the discontinuity, the probability of treatment is only approximately 0.1%, which is too small to noticeably affect the outcomes. Thus, we must rely on methods that are designed for analyzing nonexperimental data. As is typical for employed workers, non-random selection may occur at both the individual and firm levels. Because the allocation of WeGebAU subsidies is not randomized, we can only base our inferences on observed differences. Matching methods are a popular approach to identify the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) in this type of setting. Let D be the participation indicator, where D = 1 indicates participation and D = 0 refers to nonparticipation in a WeGebAU-sponsored program. Let Y D (τ ) be the outcome of interest, such as the survival rate in employment τ weeks after the beginning of the program, and X a vector of individual and employer-specific characteristics. Propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983 ) (which we use below) compares the outcomes of program participants with those of non-participants whose propensity scores P (X) = Pr(D = 1|X) are similar.
With respect to WeGebAU, we do not have a stationary treatment arrangement with predetermined treatment and control groups. Since the introduction of the program, certain workers are eligible for participation; from time to time, some of them choose to enter the program. Employed workers who are not treated now may be treated at any time in the future, and it would not be accurate to compare the outcomes of those who were treated to those who were never treated; because treatment in the case of WeGebAU is conditional on employment status, such a comparison would amount to selection based on the outcome.
This type of policy analysis in a dynamic setting is discussed by Crépon et al. (2009); Sianesi (2004) and Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) . As we are analyzing employment rather than unemployment, our approach differs slightly from that in those studies.
Let T t be a random variable denoting the calendar time for treatment 3 . We are interested in the average treatment effect at time t + τ , τ days after the treatment, which occurred at calendar month T t = t (obviously, we want to obtain these estimates for a number of different τ -s). Let Y t (t + τ ) denote the outcome of interest for a worker who is treated at t, and let Y ∞ (t + τ ) denote the never-treatment (always-later-treatment) outcome of a worker treated at t. We want to estimate
the difference in the post-treatment outcome at t + τ of those treated at T t = t and the non-treatment outcome of the same group in the hypothetical scenario in which they had not been treated. The first of these quantities, the outcome τ days after the treatment at t, is easily observable. The second term is the expected counterfactual, the never-treated outcome at the same point in time, for those treated at t. Note that ongoing participation may not prevent employers from firing an employee. However, if firms tend to postpone layoffs until training is completed, then we observe a positive "lock-in" effect that corresponds to the program duration. The lock-in effect may cause participants to retain employment for the duration of the program. However, because 75 percent of the programs are less than half a year in duration, we are certain that the ATT at longer durations reflects the treatment effect.
To identify the ATT, we require additional assumptions: a form of no-anticipation condition and a modified version of the conditional independence assumption (CIA). The former can be written as follows:
Intuitively, this assumption establishes that the individual outcome today does not depend on whether or when the person will eventually be treated in the future. This assumption neither allows the anticipated future treatment to influence the current outcome nor allows the reverse scenario-the anticipated outcome may not influence current participation.
The adapted version of the CIA establishes that
Intuitively, this assumption states that the never-treated outcome is independent of whether and when the treatment actually occurs.
Assumptions (A1) and (A2) allow us to write the counterfactual term in (1) as
Effectively, we observe the never-treated outcome Y ∞ (t) for all those workers who are not yet treated as of calendar time t + τ .
This method allows us to consistently estimate the treatment effect on the exit rate from employment. However, for a number of potentially interesting variables, such as employment probability or earnings at a certain point in time, the results may be biased. The reason is simple: over time, an increasing number of eligible individuals in the control group are treated, whereas the ineligible individuals remain, including those who terminated their employment. Hence, the control group will increasingly contain non-employed individuals for whom we are unable to observe the (latent) time of treatment. However, all actual exits from the treatment and control groups are still observed. Hence, methods such as survival analysis that rely only on these events do not suffer from that bias. Thus, we select survival in employment as our main outcome variable. Because the actual number of controls entering treatment is not large, we expect the bias in the other estimates to be minor.
The employed members of the older population do not experience any event that fundamentally redefines their situation, such as leaving a job for the unemployed. Indeed, most of these individuals have been working for decades; thus, we do not expect their behavior and relevant outcomes to change rapidly. This expectation is similar to the assumption that the ATT does not depend on the exact date of treatment (AT T ≡ AT T t ∀ t) within our two-year observation window. Hence, we may average the monthly estimates (we stratify the sample according to the month of beginning treatment below). 4 We choose a stratified matching approach in which we select controls only in the corresponding months. Finally, we also assume independent censoring for the baseline model. This assumption is harmless with respect to the fixed end date for the observation period.
Is the CIA Correct?
CIA, the assumption that the non-treatment outcome is independent of the treatment status conditional on observed characteristics, is one of the most crucial assumptions behind matching. To obtain more insight into the actual selection on the program, numerous interviews in 10 labor market agencies across Germany were conducted during the fall of 2011.
5
This qualitative evidence indicates that in the first years after WeGebAU introduction (our observation period), the caseworkers typically contacted the firms and promoted the program directly by, for example, giving presentations on WeGebAU opportunities in the workplace. This initiative on the caseworker side ensures that the program information was disseminated independently of the performance of firms and workers, and it eliminates a potential source of bias, namely, that only a select group of workers may learn about the program. Thus, the results indicate that the CIA holds in our data unless the bias at the time of uptake is overly strong.
This evidence suggests that the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) also holds. SUTVA implies that the treatment effect of a single individual is independent of the participation decision of any other individual (Rubin, 1986) . Both the explanation above and the small size of the program (in terms of inflow numbers) suggest that SUTVA is not violated in our data.
Operationalizing the Matching
Participation in WeGebAU involves decisions by at least two actors-employees and employers. Selectivity may occur at both levels. First, matching addresses the case in which participants constitute a selective subsample of workers. Second, the firms' choices to participate in WeGebAU may also be related to their business prospects, potentially introducing spurious correlations between workers' outcomes and participation. We address this bias by selecting control group individuals from only those firms that are already participating in WeGebAU-from firms in which at least one employee has previously received subsidized training by the month that we analyze (see section 4.1 below). We refer to this control group as the "Same Firm Sample." To assess the robustness of our results from that perspective, we also create another control group, henceforth referred to as the "All Workers Sample." This sample is created by merging the Same Firm Sample with 600,000 workers randomly drawn from firms not (yet) participating in WeGebAU in 2007 and 2008.
In the All Workers Sample, individuals leave the control group as soon as their employer begins using WeGebAU subsidies. To correct for potential firm-level selectivity, we control for firm descriptors when computing the propensity score. Following our dynamic matching approach, we divide our observation period into monthly 5 The interviews were conducted by IAB affiliates, permanently working in different local employment agencies. 6 We also estimate a model in which firm descriptors are replaced by firm fixed effects in the Same Firm Sample. The results (which are available upon request) are qualitatively similar.
strata. This procedure yields 18 subsamples, one for each calendar month from July 2007 to December 2008. We employ a single matching procedure for each month using the psmatch2 module in Stata12 (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) . We apply Epanechnikov kernel matching, which uses the smoothed weighted average of all individuals in the control group that lie within a given bandwidth of the propensity score to construct the counterfactual outcome 7 . We use a bandwidth of 0.01 for the Same Firm Sample and 0.001 for the All Workers Sample.
We also conduct a placebo analysis by estimating the effect of the program on pre-program employment duration. These estimates are close to zero and are not statistically significant (see Appendix A.1).
Data and Variables

Data
We use registry data from the German Federal Employment Agency, the Integrated Employment Biographies Sample (IEB). The data originate from the IAB employment history and the IAB benefit recipient history, as well as the participants-in-measures history (MTH) and the job-seeking history (ASU). From the establishment history panel (BHP), we further add the characteristics of firms. We thus use information on all employment subject to social security tax, various benefits, and participation in ALMP-s.
However, we cannot clearly identify periods during which the individuals neither receive benefits nor pay social security contributions. In particular, we cannot differentiate between self-employment and non-benefit inactivity. Hence, we look at two types of periods: non-paid employment periods, during which individuals do not receive any wages, and non-benefit periods, during which individuals do not receive unemployment benefits.
Technically, the non-paid employment periods amount to re-defining the unknown state as a non-paid employment period, while in the case of non-benefit periods we treat the unknown state as a non-benefit period.
Because the program inflow was small in early 2007, we limit our sample to those who en- (Table A. 2 presents a more detailed overview of the number of observations).
8 7 A summary of the advantages and disadvantages of this matching estimator is given in Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) . The main results remain robust when using different types of matching. 8 Note that individuals may appear in the control group more than once as controls for those whose treatment begins at different points in time. The treated individuals may serve as controls as long as they have not entered treatment themselves.
Treatment and Outcome
The current analysis focuses on the individual effects of WeGebAU subsidies. More specifically, we ask whether the measures (i.e., public subsidies for certain training courses) have any effect on the employability of the participants. Accordingly, treatment in the current analysis indicates participation in a training program sponsored by WeGebAU, and non-treatment indicates that a person is not participating in a WeGebAU-sponsored program. Note that "non-treated" workers may also participate in training, even in the same programs, when the costs are not covered by WeGebAU because we are interested in the effects of the public training subsidies rather than the actual programs that the individuals choose.
Our first outcome of interest is employment status, particularly survival in uninterrupted employment. This outcome corresponds to the original idea behind WeGebAU, namely, to improve the "employability" of workers in certain risk groups. In particular, more employable individuals should be less likely to leave employment for a period of non-employment, either because they cannot find a job or for other reasons. As stated above, we focus on paid employment as we cannot distinguish between self-employment and certain non- to 540 days after the beginning of the program. Our last outcome variable is job mobility, which refers to leaving one employer for another employer or becoming unemployed. This approach is analogous to our first outcome variable, employment stability.
Explanatory Variables
CIA assumes that we condition on all relevant individual information. Because we employ registry data, we are able to include common individual descriptors, such as gender, age and education, firm characteristics, and individual labor market history; we also include a Number of previous firms, recall (dummy), tenure with and without interruptions (months), employment (months), number of employment periods, mean duration of employment period, unemployment with receipt of benefits (months), number of unemployment (benefit) periods, mean duration of unemployment (benefit) period, job search (months), number of job search periods, mean duration of job search period, and daily wage Firm characteristics Firm size (three dummies, reference: 1-49 employees), firm age, sectoral affiliation (seven dummies, reference: construction), skill structure in the firm: share of low-skilled workers, share of middle-skilled workers, share of high-skilled workers, share of workers with unknown skill levels, share of unskilled blue-collar workers, share of skilled blue-collar workers, share of white-collar workers, and share of part-time workers Regional characteristics Unemployment rate in the month of beginning treatment at the district level, unemployment rate squared, and living in East or West Germany (dummy)
Notes: Individual, firm, and job characteristics are measured at the beginning of the employment period parallel to treatment.
set of variables describing the total amount of individual employment and unemployment during the past 12, 24, 36, and 60 months. As is typical for registry data, we do not observe individual desires and expectations, including those related to future job prospects. However, Wunsch and Lechner (2008) show that conditioning on this type of variables (such as health, benefit sanctions, and characteristics of the desired job) leaves the results for similar programs essentially unchanged. Table 2 explains the variables used for propensity score matching. Table 3 presents sample means for selected variables before matching (full statistics are available upon request).
Most indicators suggest that both treated and non-treated individuals tend to be similar. A few differences that arise, predominantly in the Same Firm Sample, merit further discussion. The treatment group slightly oversamples young eligibles and undersamples the older age groups. This difference is consistent with the life cycle investment in human capital.
The treated group also appears to have completed more education than the control group.
Relative to the control group, the larger share of skilled blue-collar and white-collar workers in the treated group indicates that more educated workers are more likely to participate in training (Fouarge et al., 2010; Fertig and Huber, 2010; Arulampalam and Booth, 1997) .
In the All Workers Sample, there are few educational differences, but part-time workers are undersampled in the treatment group. Past employment history is rather similar, but WeGebAU participants have experienced a slightly higher number of unemployment periods (benefit receipt) in the two years before beginning training, with a longer average benefit period duration. Accordingly, these participants spent less time in employment and had a larger number of shorter employment periods compared with non-participants. The participants also tended to remain with the same employer for a shorter period. The mean daily average earnings were slightly lower for WeGebAU participants than for non-participants.
However, all of these differences are rather small.
Results
In this section, we present the estimates. First, we describe the effect of the program on survival in paid employment and on survival in the non-benefit period. Thereafter, we examine the yearly employment rate, earnings and job mobility. Finally, we analyze the effect of heterogeneity for different subgroups. Table 4 and Figure 2 present the estimated effects for survival in employment-the difference in employment survival rates between WeGebAU participants and non-participants.
Survival in Employment
We repeat here that survival in employment is an indicator of uninterrupted employment, not overall employment. Table 4 Because our data cover a rather short time span, the standard errors become very large as they approach a duration of two years.
When treating unknown periods as non-benefit periods, we also find initial positive effects.
However, these effects are smaller and become statistically insignificant before approximately two years. Participants are only 0.5 percentage point less likely to begin receiving benefits compared with non-participants. This indicates that the program mainly discourages workers from leaving paid employment; the influence on unemployment benefit claims is small.
The estimates using individuals from non-participating firms as controls (All Workers Sample in Table 4 ) are smaller and become statistically insignificant after approximately one year. Note also that the confidence intervals for both samples largely overlap. However, lower point estimates still suggest that comparable employees from firms that have not (yet) participated in WeGebAU remain slightly longer in initial employment than controls from participating firms. The results lend some support to the idea that WeGebAU is used as a substitute for temporary layoffs during difficulties. Alternatively, the different estimates for the All Workers Sample may stem from firms with only a few older employees-recall that this sample also includes firms with only one worker. We will keep these considerations in mind when discussing further results. However, as we focus on individual effects, we primarily use the Same Firm Sample below. In summary, our analysis suggests that uninterrupted employment periods are longer for treated workers than for workers in the control group. Up to two years after the beginning of treatment, the difference in the survival in paid employment is approximately 2.5 percentage points in favor of the participants, relative to the non-participants. However, the effect on benefit claims is smaller.
Next, we analyze the impact of the program on job mobility (Table 5 and Figure A.1) . We observe a pattern that closely resembles that for employment: treated individuals are more likely to remain in the original firm than control individuals. The ATT estimates are larger than those for employment stability discussed above and are statistically significant in most cases, varying between 1 and 2 percentage points. For the All Workers Sample, we obtain positive but slightly smaller numbers. Together, these results suggest that participation lowers both employment-to-non-employment mobility and between-firm mobility.
Analysis of Different Subsamples
Here, we divide the sample along various dimensions and estimate the effect on the respective sub-samples. We perform the analysis separately for men and women, for young and old workers, for full-time and part-time workers, and for short-and longer-duration programs. Because we have no information regarding the actual content of the programs that the participants attended, the reported program duration serves as a proxy for the program type.
The results for paid employment are presented in Figure 3 . All of the subsamples analyzed exhibit a substantial reduction in the tendency to leave paid employment. The largest and increasing effects are experienced by part-time workers and by participants of longer programs; by the end of the second year, the positive effects are larger for those over 50 than for those between 45 and 50 years of age. The effect on transitions to benefits is relatively smaller (Figure A. 2). However, part-time workers show the greatest effect here as well.
The estimates for the other groups are small and typically insignificant (except for men), and we conclude that the program prolongs the employment periods primarily by discouraging workers from exiting the labor force. For the older group, non-paid employment is likely a form of retirement, as self-employment at that age seems unlikely. Table 6 presents the disaggregated estimates for the other outcome variables (for paid employment periods only). These estimates support the previous interpretation. The program appears to advance employment more for workers over 50 years old and for part-time workers. The employment duration for these workers increases by 1.5 to 4 percent, which is almost double or even triple the increase for full-time workers. As expected, we find stronger employment effects for the long-duration programs (more than 60 days). With respect to the latter, we also capture a positive effect for median monthly earnings (approximately 72 monthly). The positive effect on earnings suggests that improved employment duration is not simply caused by lock-in effects; rather, participants actually profit from more productive jobs, at least after participating in a longer-duration program. 
Summary and Concluding Remarks
Public sector training subsidies for employed workers constitute a widely used labor market policy in Europe (Bassanini et al., 2005) . However, little is known about the efficacy of such programs. In this paper, we evaluate one of these measures, the German WeGebAU subsidized training programs for older employees (at least 45 years old) working in small and medium-sized firms (fewer than 250 employees), introduced in 2007. Because the implementation does not offer any suitable instrument, we rely on a dynamic version of propensity score matching (Crépon et al., 2009) The results indicate that WeGebAU participation leads to improved job stability and survival in employment. More detailed analysis shows that this effect arises primarily from a declining likelihood of leaving paid employment, presumably into a form of retirement. The effect on insured unemployment is rather small. Part-time workers clearly exhibit strong gains from the program. This finding is encouraging, particularly given that part-time work is increasingly common at older ages and is often considered a form of early retirement.
Although the sample size is small, this group appears to exhibit gains in all relevant dimensions, although the estimated effect on earnings is not significant, which suggests that subsidized training may be a means of increasing the labor market attachment to part-time workers and to older workers in general. In this matter, our results are not consistent with those of Boockmann et al. (2012) , who show that part-time work as a specific measure for older employees does not prolong employment duration.
Not surprisingly, we find that long-duration training has a larger effect than short-duration training for both employment and earnings. The improvement in earnings suggests that the effect on employment is not simply an artifact of the lock-in effect. Increased training over a long period with the objective of acquiring in-depth knowledge is more effective in improving employability than shorter periods of training. 11 Given the assumption that the typical daily wage is close to the sample mean, 80, this approach would result in approximately 1500 of additional salary earned. Potential gains by employers and public gains through reduced benefits must also be added. Assuming 10 In 2012, the Federal Employment Agency decided to subsidize only those training courses with a minimal duration of four weeks. Our results offer a partial ex-post justification for that decision, although a costbenefit analysis should still be performed. 11 253 is the approximate yearly number of workdays in Germany.
that those are of similar magnitude as the private returns, we may conclude that our estimates point toward average gains in the order of 3000 per person over the three years following the beginning of employee training, given the lost domestic production is not big.
These figures suggest that total social gains from the WeGebAU program may be positive.
However, to pay for the average out-of-pocket costs for the government ( 2090) When interpreting these results, we must consider that the positive effects that we find become much smaller or even vanish when using controls from firms that did not utilize the WeGebAU programs. This possibility might imply that the additional participants from firms with few older employees that we include in the All Workers Sample perform worse.
Another explanation is that controls from participating firms perform worse than those from non-participating firms, which implies that firm selectivity is important and that WeGebAU is used as a substitute for lay-offs primarily by firms encountering difficulties.
It is instructive to compare our results with those of similar programs. Our estimated effects are dwarfed by those of the Workforce Investment Act, in which training increases the monthly salary by approximately 100 and employment probability by approximately 8 percentage points (Heinrich et al., 2009 ). However, our results offer a view that is more optimistic than that presented in a number of European studies. For example, Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004) do not find any effect on wages, and Abramovsky et al. (2011) offers no evidence that subsidized training for low-skilled workers increases their training participation rates. Additionally, Kristensen (2012) , who analyzes the effect of cumulative life-cycle training on retirement decisions, concludes that training is not an adequate measure for prolonging employment careers.
More work is required to refine the estimates that are provided in this paper. In particular, a more detailed cost-benefit analysis would be valuable when more detailed expenditure data become available.
A.1 Placebo Analysis
As a further check, we estimate the "treatment effect" on a number of pre-treatment variables (Table A.1). We choose cumulative employment before the individuals actually entered WeGebAU. The measures are indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
A.2 Number of Observations by Month
